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In dealing with the question of a future system
for governance in Solomon Islands, two
options have been put on the table: patch up
the existing system or convert the existing
provinces into states under a federal system. I
question whether the public has had a chance
to discuss a third option—that is, more
effective use of local governance—and point
to the variety of informal governance
structures that rural communities have formed
to fulfil their needs in the absence of effective
government. I argue that better articulation of
these kinds of organisations with the state
may do more for development through broad-
based participation than federalising.
The current calls for a federal system in
Solomon Islands are not new. The problems
of the centrally biased government now in
place have been recognised by Solomon
Islanders since discussions on an
appropriate system began prior to
independence in 1978. In the main the
criticisms are twofold. First, that central
government does not recognise rural people’s
wish to self-govern as culturally distinct
island communities (represented by the
functionally weak but identity-strong
provinces) and second, that central
government is not effective in developing the
rural areas, which is where most people live
(for example, health and education services
are poor in many areas, and there are too few
ways to earn money). In return, the central
government has often said that it could do a
better job if it could shut down the
functionally rather useless provincial
governments and use the resources on better
services. To this, many people say that the
provinces are important because they act as
a buffer and gateway between traditional
local life and modern foreign life—the
province understands its people, while the
central government does not. There is a
strong distrust in rural areas of central
government, which is viewed as being run
by an élite whose interests run opposite to
the people at the grassroots.
The question of federalism resurfaced in
2000, at the time ethnically focused
communities were in the thick of fighting one
another under the name of their provinces,
and simultaneously the central government
revealed long-held plans to strip the
provinces of power.1 An explanation was
circulated, suggesting that the civil war was
the work of the much-distrusted Honiara
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élite, whose shady business and land deals
were tied to deep corruption within the
central government, which was, the critics
said, dominated by one provincial-ethnic
group anyway. Although the conspiracy
allegations were part of the Ulufa’alu
government crying foul, paradoxically many
saw its proposal to disestablish the
provinces as a deepening of the rot. Quickly
the idea rippled through rural communities
that the best way to end the senseless violence
and years of underdevelopment was to strip
power from the centre and return it to the
provinces where, each province minding its
own business, they could build development
as cultural communities with minimal
national obligations. Many of the élite, it
turned out, were no more nationalistic than
their grassroots wantoks , and promptly
returned to their home provinces where, in
an atmosphere of public support, they drew
up provincial plans ready for federalism,
using the long-suppressed 1987
constitutional review report as a road map.2
By late 2000 and since then, another old
discourse was dusted off, this time by the
culpable élite. This was that centralism was
a foreign devil, inspired by the British and
fed from overseas. Although some National
Peace Council officials were concerned about
national fragmentation exacerbating conflict,
the Ministry of Provincial Government
pushed ahead the ‘home-grown state
system’ with apparently almost unanimous
political support. Nationally, decentralisation
had come of age: all agreed that major
institutional change was necessary and,
although not all agreed with the means, the
federal option was the only one on the table.
At this time, the notion of decentralisation
was prevalent in the international arena
(particularly for large, weak African states),
although those foreigners who questioned
whether it was feasible in Solomon Islands
generally knew better than to defend the
‘devil’ of centralism, at least in public. Five
years have now past, the high-pitch fervour
has subsided, while technical hurdles to
implementation seem to be mounting. Some
communities now seem doubtful that any
change will occur and affirm their desire for
state government, while others say they have
lost interest. In the hiatus there are calls for
‘more consultation’.3 The need for
institutional change is real, but in hindsight
there is one clarification, one problem, one
flaw, one question and one alternative to the
federalism option that stand out.
The clarification is about the kind of
decentralisation being considered. It is to
shrink central functions, swell the provinces
into ‘states’ with strong jurisdictional power
(with their own constitution, laws, police
and courts) and most of the service delivery
(health, education, transport and so on), with
both the decision-making and the service
delivery in some way linked to the grassroots.
Each state will act as a silo, performing each
of the functions for itself, without any
overlap between provinces. The centre
functions to coordinate only on common
issues, primarily international affairs.
The problem is that this type of
federalism is expensive. Economies of scale
will not be achieved by the smaller or most
dispersed states, or perhaps by any of them.
The cost of each state running its own
hospital system, for example, may be too
much to bear. Sceptics think some states will
struggle to find people who are qualified and
experienced to execute the state’s
administrative systems properly. Shabby
administration could also be very expensive.
The flaw relates to the cost. Already
some predict that if the silo model extends to
each state depending mostly on its own
resources, national tensions will increase
because some states will be hungrier than
others: the result will be higher mortality and
lower personal prospects in the poorer
states.4 Without better economies of scale and
adequate national redistribution
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mechanisms, this is likely to pit one state
against another. Distrust between the
culturally separated communities will run
high, at a time when building trust between
communities is still a major donor peace-
building objective. If the centre has the
jurisdictional power to collect taxes or pool
donor funds and redistribute according to
need, or has the power to order services in
larger units, power is drawn away from each
of the states and Solomon Islands is back to
centralism, with the grassroots once again
reduced to what is given them by distant
élites. This kind of silo federalism is a flawed
model because it cannot handle the dual
requirements of equitable development and
broad participation.
What does the call for federalism
represent anyway? The starting point in the
call for ‘state government’ is that central
government has performed poorly, initially
in not providing for better rural development
and then by ignoring long-term calls for
community participation in governance.
Only federalism has been seriously discussed
in public as the alternative way to deal with
these issues. There is evidence that when
another alternative is put forward in rural
community discussions, public support
appears not to be so much ‘pro state
government’ as ‘anti central government’.
People will take state government if they
think that is the only option to central
government. Another alternative arises from
interviews with rural Solomon Islanders
themselves.
This alternative is simply stated by rural
Solomon Islanders: help us to help ourselves
through our own home-grown associations.
These are the various village, health, school
and sports committees, councils of chiefs,
church women’s and youth groups, and
smallholder produce and marketing
associations that are found in great numbers
in rural areas. Mostly these are informal,
unregistered associations. Through these the
communities help run clinics and primary
schools, improve village public goods and
spaces, collaborate more widely to provide
informal education and cultural activities,
promote livelihoods development, resolve
grievances and make decisions on land and
natural resources use. Apart from their
variety of purposes, these associations vary
in membership, scale and in the way they
are embedded in the institutional
frameworks of traditional culture, church
and aspects of government.5
Many people complain that the
government has never recognised these local
associations or their efforts, and that they get
no support to build their capacity. Capacity
assistance (advice and skills transfer, and
small grants) is seen as very important
because success of local associations in
getting things done is admitted to be very
uneven. While the plethora of local
associations has arisen because rural people
have needed to organise their own service
delivery in the absence of government
assistance, most see a major role for
government. This role is not to take over
responsibilities and close down local
associations or set up local government
agencies in competition, but rather to work
through existing local associations to get
things done. Part of this demand is expressed
as an accountability issue—local people say
that when government operates without
direct local participation, the budget is
wasted without getting local results. In this
kind of discussion, it is common to find the
sentiment that as long as there is
development at the local level, many local
people are not concerned whether or not state
government comes about. Most are sceptical
that the central government can ever deliver
because it is remote and seen as inherently
corrupt; but then many think that state
government will also be inscrutable and
corrupt. The call from rural people is for direct
local participation in decision-making and
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implementation, through local associations
that are supported by their government.
Key to this is to identify ways in which
government can support local initiatives
rather than attempt, so far without success,
to command from above. Arguments about
top-down or bottom-up, utopian fantasies of
a ‘world turned upside down’ where
commoners rule the chiefs (Larmour 1997)
do not in themselves provide the answer. The
proponents of mediating structures lying
between the local level and the central state
(such as ‘state government’) are right in
principle; the answer lies instead in the space
between. The question is what does the
‘middle level’ look like if state government is
not necessarily the right answer?
Restructures, reviews, white papers and
parliamentary bills in 1977–81, 1986–88,
1996–97 and 1998–99 have all grappled with
the same problem, but still nothing looks fit
to carry the dual load of equitable
development and broad participation.6
Recent approaches in policy science to multi-
level governance and citizen engagement
help imagine the previously unimaginable. I
will now discuss these.
In an analysis of types of systems of
governance, Hooghe and Marks (2003)
discern just two basic options for liberal
democratic systems beyond the centralised
state (or its failure). Both these basic options
are forms of multi-level governance. They are,
to use their terms, type I (general purpose
jurisdictions), and type II (task-specific
jurisdictions). Existing forms of decentralised
or devolved democratic governance around
the world fit into one or other of these types,
or exhibit elements of both. In Solomon
Islands, both the present provincial system
and the proposed federal system are ‘type I’.
Before explaining further the differences
between type I and type II systems, I will
briefly cover the main features of provincial
government as it stands to point out its
similarities to the proposed federalism.
The present type of government in
Solomon Islands has two functioning tiers,
in an arrangement of a ‘decentralised union’
type (Watts 2001). The Solomon Islands
parliament established the provinces under
the national constitution. The provinces have
no separate constitutions of their own, but
operate under the Provincial Government
Act. The Act is not specific about the
functions of the provinces, although each
recurrent national budget provides a number
of provincial grants, mainly the provincial-
services grant, the revenue-sharing grant,
and the ‘special supplementary grant’. These
grants enable provinces to set up what have
de facto  become known as provincial
ministries to cover a range of services, and
the elected provincial assembly is able to
approve the provincial executive’s budget for
appropriation of the grants. There is some
devolution associated with these budgets, but
the mainstream services (such as police,
education and health) follow national
policies and the staff of these ministries’
provincial offices are on the national payroll,
as are the provinces’ own administrative
staff. Legislation is national, although
limited provincial ordinances are possible.
In the main, power lies with the national
government, and the establishment of the
present rather lightweight provinces was
originally a compromise brought on by
unavoidable calls for provincial autonomy,
particularly from the Western District, in the
lead up to legislation of the national
constitution in 1978 (Ghai 1990).
Even if reforms allow for provincial
constitutions and properly devolve functions
such as education, health and police, the
main characterising feature that will remain
is the way that the new states will be designed
as
• based on non-intersecting provincial-
ethnic communities
• general purpose authorities that bundle
competencies together (for example, run
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all health, education, police, public
works and so on within their
jurisdictional territory)
• standing as a limited number of
permanent state jurisdictions. They will
preserve the idea of government as a set
of nested territorial hierarchies.
In these features, both the current
‘decentralised union’ and the proposed
‘federal’ system of government conform to a
‘type I’ system in Hooghe and Marks’
distinction. The strong grip of the ideal-type
hierarchical model inherited from the British
is very evident, for example, in the proposal
for state design assembled by the leading
proponent of federalism during the tension
period, the ‘Western State Government’
(Political and Legislative Task Force 2001).7
Despite the radicalism of the Western State
movement at the time, their task force
proposals show that aside from an
unspecified ‘open access mode of operation’
between ‘village governments’ and the state
government, they envisaged a standard set-
up of state-run line ministries that cover all
manner of functions up to the interstate
boundaries. The idea that government in
Solomon Islands conforms to (and should
continue to conform to) this ideal type of a
hierarchical silo is pervasive among the
country’s leaders, but does not represent the
actual situation or even their own practice.
Here I explain why.
In its day, the hierarchical type of
government left behind as a legacy of British
colonialism was supposed to deliver public
service according to rational principles
whose policies were set by elected
representatives. The breakdown of this
system since independence in a welter of
ineffective management and corruption has
been widely commented on, but of more
interest here are the kinds of governance that
have developed around the failure of the state
to provide public services. While at the local
level there are the kinds of ‘self-help’
organisations that communities create to
provide local services in the absence of
government provision, at the national level
are a range of supra-national and
international government agencies (the
donors) and non-government organisations.
Donors often bypass Solomon Islands
government involvement in project
implementation. Some of these projects
establish links to community service
provision, such as the EU small grants
scheme, or go further and develop for this
purpose a parallel multi-level structure that
relies very little on the government, such as
has happened with the AusAID Community
Sector Program. From a base of church
organisations that were the original service
providers (providing schools and clinics
well before government became involved), a
wide variety of non-government
organisations now operate almost entirely
on donor funds to deliver public services with
minimal government involvement. Service
provision is no longer a matter of government
line ministries trundling out development far
into the distant future according to executive
government blueprints. It is a multiplex
environment of differing kinds of agencies
entering into varied inter-agency agreements
that operate on multiple timeframes and with
differing agency-specific policy objectives.
This is a similar transformation to that which
has occurred in government in Britain itself,
with the new phenomenon called ‘network
governance’ (Rhodes 1997; Skelcher 2005).
Slow, old procedure-driven government in
Solomon Islands has become almost a
bystander to the plethora of function-specific
agencies networking and competing around,
over, under and even through it. Legitimation
for all this activity has occurred by a slow
syncretism of the original Westminster
democracy with a consociational style of
governance (see Andeweg 2000), developed
on the ‘big-man’ model by figures such as
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Mamaloni. Except for the brief period of élite
competition during the tension, this has been
run by a tacit consensus among the political
élite to accommodate of a multiplicity of
approaches to development.
Recognition of this broader environment
of formal government leads toward what
Hooghe and Marks (2003) call ‘type II’ multi-
level governance, or what others have called
‘polycentric’ governance (McGinnis 1999). As
with the situation that has developed in
Solomon Islands, a polycentric system is one
in which many independent agencies are
linked not through a coherent hierarchy (the
type I model) but one in which different
organisations, large and small, focus on
specific objectives, more or less coordinating
with each other. In relation to the levels at
which different agencies operate, from local
scale, through middle-scale and to national
scale, Hooghe and Marks have nicknamed
this the ‘marble-cake’ model, meaning that the
‘layers’ are not neatly stacked on top of each
other, but overlap and can have different
vertical as well as horizontal extents. A classic
example in Solomons of the operation of
networks in a multi-level, polycentric system
is the enduring provision of education
services by churches. Here there is
overlapping service provision by different
denominations. Each operates in church
denominational jurisdictions (dioceses) under
government agreement to co-manage
educational facilities, and also incorporate the
many and varied local school management
associations based in the villages, who help
run each school. The principle of overlapping
jurisdictions is an important counterweight
to the stacking of service provision into
exclusive ethnic-provincial jurisdictional
territories, and provides incentives for cross-
jurisdictional cooperation. Different functions
can have differently organised spatial extents
and memberships. At the local level too, the
existing patterns of local organisations have
a tradition of linking to ‘mid-level’ organis-
ations: local women’s groups inviting in a
non-government organisation or a ministry
to provide workshops at a district church rally
is an example. Again, this local-to-mid-level
network of linkages is common, although it
substantially bypasses the line ministries.
If presented as a ‘model’ of governance,
the idea of polycentric network governance
would look overly complicated to those who
want to see the whole picture. The point is
that the system of governance is already
polycentric and network oriented in the
absence of the government to fulfil the old
style of ideal state role. It is better to
understand coordination arrangements from
the point of view of stakeholders working in
a particular sector. A local area often already
supports a number of local associations of
varying types, and each of these may be in
some kind of network or co-management
arrangement. This happens as soon as, for
example, a local association raises funds to
add a classroom to a church-run, government-
salaried primary school, or a local agricultural
association joins an non-government
organisation operated seedsavers network.
Keeping track of, adjusting and extending
these sorts of networks is precisely the grist of
local association politics, and each mid-level
non-government organisation also knows its
local clients. Non-government organisations
are well known for forming associations
among themselves (for example, the Solomon
Islands Association of Rural Training Centres,
or the National Council of Women) that are
able to interact with donors and government
while maintaining their local linkages. Seeing
how the relevant part of the system works from
each participant’s perspective is human-scale
and comprehensible. What is required is not
a government that needs to ‘control’ all this
activity occurring beyond it in civil space but
to support it with core public goods provision
(such as institutional regulation).
Before concluding, I sketch a scenario of
the kind of governance that may result from
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this approach. Members of village-based
local associations are able to find mid-level
partners who provide skills transfer or grants
for local activities, cultivate organisational
capacity and broaden uptake of association
membership (gender, youth). Associations do
not have to conform to set boundaries like
area-council wards, but may have a scale
dependent on the capacity and purpose of
the association. Overlapping associations
promote multiple networking and soften
hardened territorial rivalries and jealousies.
Mid-level partners may be drawn from non-
government organisations or government
desk agencies providing services suited to
the needs of the local associations in that
service sector, and in turn governments and
donors support agencies able to fulfil
demands as determined by wider
international concerns and co-management
of evolving sectoral policy with mid-level
players. In this scenario, it may be that state
government becomes a limited public good,
because government works much more
through agency arrangements that inhabit
functional jurisdictions than sitting as
functional silos within exclusive territorial
jurisdictions. Whether or not federalism is
involved depends on its usefulness in
achieving the primary intent, which is to
provide a system of governance that enables
development through broad participation at
the local level. Here at a broader level than
the federalism debate is a general approach
essentially drawn from existing strengths at
the local level that may just get the job done.
Conclusion
Without delving into schools of thought or
the implications of specific policy choices, I
have introduced a fresh orientation to the
policy problem of decentralisation in
Solomon Islands. I began with a challenge,
pointing out that many political leaders in
Solomon Islands (and possibly their overseas
advisers) are locked into thinking about
variations on a single model of governance.
This thinking revolves around how
decentralised or devolved should the old
British top-down style of government be. The
current approach to federalism is of this type,
and may not solve the problems it is intended
for. It ignores almost entirely the question of
local-level participation, does not guarantee
more equitable development, and may create
more conflict between provinces than it solves.
There are prominent ideas on
governance systems that are highly relevant
to Solomon Islands, which have not yet been
discussed by Solomon Islands leaders or the
public. They most certainly do not advocate
a return to centralism, rather they advocate
more local participation and show in broad
terms how this can be done. Such ideas
represent the latest thinking among
institutional theorists, and build on rapid
changes to liberal democratic systems of
governance occurring around the world. The
relevance of these ideas is that they seem to
fit better the criteria that Solomon Islanders
should have a system of governance that
provides for provincial identity, equitable
development and local participation.
Best of all, these new ideas inspire
thinking on ways that the informal systems
of governance that are already ‘home grown’
in Solomon Islands’ villages can be
incorporated, and fit with the Solomon Islands
way of getting things done through multiple
networks and partnerships. These new ideas
provide answers to the old question of how to
connect dynamically ‘traditional’ local level
governance with ‘modern’ formal systems of
government in Solomon Islands. This ‘third
way’ of improving governance by making
better use of local strengths might yet lead to
the real ‘home-grown’ system of governance
for Solomon Islands.
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Notes
1 The first public release of Solomon Islands
(1999) was a 5–page summary presented at
The Australian National University/
Solomon Islands College of Higher
Education (ANU/SICHE) Solomon Islands
Governance and Economics Update in
Honiara, 16–17 March 2000.
2 ‘Beneath Guadalacanal’, online document
authored by the Prime Minister’s Office
(Honiara), early 2000 (url now extinct). Many
people did not see the document so its
contents were circulated by word-of-mouth.
My description of village discussion of the
tension, the élite’s return to the provinces
and their statehood activities are based on
my fieldwork observations on
Kolombangara and in Gizo, Western
Province March–October 2000. Details of a
proposed federal system were contained in
Solomon Islands (1987).
3 Examples include ‘S. Choiseul establishes
state govt structure’, Solomon Star 15 April
2005, ‘Savo chiefs endorse proposed federal
system’, Solomon Star 20 April 2005, ‘Isabel
supports state system’, Solomon Star 9 June
2005, ‘Central Premier voices support for
federal system’, Solomon Star  4 July 2005,
‘West reaffirms wish for state govt’, Solomon
Star 29 July 2005; ‘Ulu’s constituency opposes
federal system’ Solomon Star 2 March 2005;
‘WP leaders resolve to further consultation’,
Solomon Star 28 February 2005, ‘Consultations
essential for federal constitution—PM’,
Solomon Star 2 March 2005.
4 This centrifugal effect has been an old concern
of federalism in Solomon Islands, see
Larmour 1990.
5 The interviews with rural Solomon Islanders
mentioned, and survey of the characteristics
of rural associations were carried out by me
and partly documented by AusAID (2003).
6 Papers by Nanau (2002), Nanau (1998),
Frazer (1995), Ghai (1990), Larmour (1985)
and Premdas (1982) cover the successive
reviews and implementations of
decentralisation in Solomons, and provide
primary references.
7 This ideal type of a hierarchical, self-contained
state is often called a Westphalian state
(Caporaso 2000), which usually refers to
nation–states but calls by the statehood
movement during the Solomons tension for
inter–state population movement controls
linked to territorial autonomy exhibited a
Westphalian style of sub-nationalism. Scales
(2003) gives the political background to the
self-appointment of the Western State
Government during 2000.
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